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SMOKING AND PARENTING: CAN
THEY BE ADJUDGED MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE ACTIVITIES?
This note addresses the potential implications of a recent
California case ordering the parent of a minor child to refrain
from smoking in the child's presence. Exploring the constitutional
issues raised by the order, the author concludes that courts may
not regulate parents' smoking in the child's home.
INTRODUCTION
On August 14, 1990, Anna Mane De Bern Souza was issued
a custody modification order which prohibited her from smoking
cigarettes in her child's presence.' The order is to remain in force
until her child reaches age eighteen.2 If De Beni Souza smokes'
in the child's presence prior to that time, her custody rights will
terminate and physical custody of the child will vest in the father.4
The impact of this decision goes beyond the fact that it is the first
time a court has restricted parental use of cigarettes in the home.
Not only has the decision laid a foundation for further abrogation
of smokers' rights in general, but it raises distinct legal questions
concerning De Beni Souza's individual and parental rights. The
decision challenges De Beni Souza's rights as an individual to
formulate her own habits and to preside over her home, raising an
issue as to whether a court may intrude upon this sphere of pnva-
1. De Bern Souza v. Kallweit, No. 807516 (Sacramento Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 1990). See
The Custody Case That Went Up in Smoke, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1990 (reporting the De
Bent Souza decision).
2. De Beni Souza, No. 807516.
3. For purposes of this note, consistent with current legislative teranmnology, 'smoking"
is defined as the carrying or holding of any lit tobacco product. See Carl D. Mayhew,
Note, Smoking in Public: This Air Is My Air, This Air Is Your Air, 4 S. ILL. U. L.J.
665, 680 (1984).
4. De Ben Souza, No. 807516.
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cy. Additionally, the opinion implicates De Beni Souza's right as a
parent to interact freely with and control over her child. Giving
due consideration to the interests of the parent, child and state,
does the state have the power to regulate such conduct within the
home under the guise of a custody determination? Do parental
rights bar the state's actions or are these rights outweighed by the
state's interests?
This note explores the issues raised by this unprecedented
action. Section one examines smoking's physical effects, its prior
regulation and the ensuing controversy. Section two addresses the
validity of restricting smoking in private. First, section two analyz-
es whether this decision is unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates either the right to smoke or the right to privacy. The right
to privacy discussion reviews the degree and variety of protection
offered the home, the activity and the participant. Second, section
two examines the court's action as a custody decision and ques-
tions its propriety under generally applicable custody standards.
The author concludes that private regulation of smoking is not
legitimate so long as smoking remains a lawful activity. Smoking
itself does not garner constitutional protection, even within the
home. However, a parent's autonomy in raising a child is protect-
ed, even if the manner of upbringing chosen involves some inci-
dental exposure to cigarette smoke. Furthermore, since smoking
bears no relation to the parent-child bond, smoking cannot be a
criterion in a custody decision unless it can be shown to have a
clear detrimental effect upon the child. Thus, while a parent's
smoking may be a sufficient factor to deny custody of a child who
is predisposed to respiratory problems or has developed specific
complications warranting a smoke-free environment, there is no
sound basis for abridging parental rights absent these special cir-
cumstances.
I. THE ESSENCE OF SMOKING
AND SMOKING REGULATION
A. Health Concerns
Smoking is harmful both because of the chemicals which are
inhaled and because of the by-products it contributes to indoor air
pollution. Composed of gaseous and incidental particulate matter,
tobacco smoke harbors a variety of chemical substances. 5 Research
5. Curtis R. Cowan, Note, Florida Nonsmokers Need Legislative Action to "Clear the
1026 [Vol. 42:1025
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indicates that tobacco smoke contains as many as 4,000 distinct
substances, some of which are toxic. 6 On average, a single ciga-
rette injects "approximately seventy milligrams of dry particulate
matter and twenty three milligrams of carbon monoxide" into the
environment.' While this release of smoke is inevitable, its effect
will be dissipated to some degree. The volume of "untainted" air
into which the smoke is released lessens the concentration, and,
consequently, the effect of the smoke.' This dilution process is
commonly referred to as "aging."9
Nonetheless, once released, tobacco smoke holds the potential
to cause physical harm. The dry matter comprising tobacco smoke
can exacerbate eye, nose and throat irritations and can trigger
coughing and headaches, even in non-allergic persons."0 Carbon
monoxide decreases the effectiveness of the circulatory system by
restricting the vital flow of oxygen to the body." In addition to
the physical harm, carbon monoxide may encourage other adverse:
effects "such as altered auditory discrimination, visual acuity, abili-
ty to distinguish relative brightness, and impaired time interval
discrimination."' 2
The pollutants pose a health risk to smokers and nonsmokers
alike. 3 Risks to the smoker were first officially identified in a
Air," 8 NOVA L.J. 389, 392 (1984).
6. Tobacco smoke contains tar, nicotine, benzene ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, poloni-
urn, hydrocyanic acid and aldehydes. Id Carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide have been
found as well. Lynn F. Vuich, Note, Toward Recognition of Nonsmokers' Rights in Illi-
nois, 5 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 610, 611 (1974).
7. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Extinguishing Brushfires: Legal Limits on the Smoking
of Tobacco, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 437 (1984). Note that the number, concentration
and variety of contaminants found in each cigarette differ significantly according to the
brand chosen. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 5 (1975) [hereinafter 1975
REPORT].
8. Vuich, supra note 6, at 611.
9. ROBERT D. TOLLISON, CLEARING THE AIR: PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL TO-
BACCO SMOKE 8 (1988).
10. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 437.
11. Id. Interference with the circulatory system could in turn act as a catalyst for fur-
ther difficulties by accelerating the heart rate and reducing productivity. Id. at 437-38.
12. Vuich, supra note 6, at 612.
13. Arguably, an additional area of harm is America's pocketbook. One scholar sug-
gests a universal harm since the habit itself leads to poor health which in turn leads to
huge medical care bills and business/productivity expenses, and since the public bears the
costs of environmental consequences and government subsidies to the tobacco industry.
Les Nelkin, Note, No Butts About It: Smokers Must Pay for Their Pleasure, 12 COLUM.
J. ENVTL L. 317, 322-30 (1987). Countering this line of argument are the huge benefits
that the tobacco industry contributes as a primary source of revenue for many state econ-
102719921
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1964 United States Surgeon General's report.1 4 The report targeted
cigarette smoking as a substantial contributor "to mortality from
certain specific diseases and to the overall death rate." 5 Specifi-
cally, the report found a causal link between tobacco usage and
cancer," chronic bronchitis, 7  emphysema," non-maligant re-
spiratory disease," cardiovascular disease, ° premature coronary
heart disease2' and low birth weight.2  Furthermore, though a
causal link has yet to be shown, smokers are generally more prone
to peptic ulcers, cirrhosis of the liver and amblymyopia."3
Nonetheless, smoking is not necessarily without benefit to the
smoker. "The significant beneficial effects of smoking occur pri-
marily in the area of mental health, and the habit originates in a
search for contentment."'24 The bond between smoker and cigarette
appears to take root in a psychological desire or as an expression
of social and personal freedom.2" Cigarette consumers willingly
choose to risk some physical harm to themselves in exchange for
the mental satisfaction and reduced anxiety that results from smok-
ing. Unfortunately, these subjective effects are largely immeasurable
and, therefore, cannot be concretely balanced against those that
have been scientifically documented.26
omies. Mayhew, supra note 3, at 665.
14. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, SMOKING AND HEALTH 33, 37-40 (1964)
[hereinafter 1964 REPORT].
15. Id. at 31. Although the actual number of deaths caused by cigarette use was un-
known, the committee estimated that each age group of males experienced a seventy
percent increase in the death rate as a direct result of smoking. Id.
16. Lung cancer is by far the most prevalent cancer connected to cigarette smoking. In
addition, evidence suggests a causal link between smoking and oral, laryngeal, esophageal
and urinary bladder cancer. Id. at 31-32. A later report also linked cancer of the pharynx
and pancreas to smoking. 1975 REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
17. "Cigarette smoking is the most important of the causes of chronic bronchitis in the
United States . . . .- 1964 REPORT, supra note 15, at 31.
18. While research reveals a relationship between smoking and emphysema, it has
failed to demonstrate a causal link. Id.
19. 1975 REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
20. 1964 REPORT, supra note 14, at 32.
21. Premature coronary heart disease is "[the most important specific health conse-
quence of cigarette smoking in terms of the number of people affected." 1975 REPORT,
supra note 7, at 4.
22. 1964 REPORT, supra note 14, at 39.
23. Id. Amblymyopia is a -dimness of vision unexplained by an organic lesion." Id.
24. Id. at 32.
25. See id. (noting that smokers usually begin their habit as a result of peer pressure).
26. Id.
1028 [Vol. 42:1025
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Smoking places nonsmokers27 at risk by virtue of the air they
breathe. Cigarette consumption produces mainstream smoke which
is inhaled through the cigarette filter by the smoker and sidestrearn
smoke which flows unfiltered from the burning tip of the ciga-
rette.2 To enjoy a single cigarette, the typical smoker inhales
"'[eight to nine] times . . . for a total of [twenty-four] seconds, but
the cigarette bums for [twelve] minutes and pollutes the air contin-
uously .... ,,29 The nonsmoker takes in both sidestream and ex-
haled smoke,3" but rarely, if ever, in their purest forms. The
smoke flowing from the cigarette's tip and the residue exhaled by
the smoker are aged by the clean air in the environment." More-
over, the nonsmoker, who employs a respiratory pattern consisting
of regular inhaling and exhaling, necessarily absorbs less pollutants
than the smoker who draws in and holds the smoke in the mouth
and respiratory organs before exhaling.3 2 Even so, some studies
have suggested that, when exposed to a large dosage of smoke, the
nonsmoker suffers many of the same effects as the smoker him-
self.33 However, these conclusions have been criticized as being
premised upon inaccurate and unsupported data.34
27. Also referred to as passive, secondhand or involuntary smokers.
28. Morley Swingle, Note, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The
Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 MO. L. REV. 444, 447 (1980).
29. Cowan, supra note 5, at 392 (quoting Epstein, The Effects of Tobacco Smoke Pol-
lution on the Eyes of the Allergic Nonsmoker, 2 SMOKING AND HEALTH 337, 338 (1975)).
30. Sidestream smoke presents a greater danger to the nonsmoker because it is unfil-
tered. By contrast, the incidental exhaled smoke which the nonsmoker consumes has been
filtered twice - once by the cigarette filter and once by the smoker's lungs. Swingle,
supra note 28, at 447.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
32. Tollison, supra note 9, at 9.
33. For instance, several researchers have concluded that there is a causal link between
lung cancer and secondhand smoke inhalation. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUN-
TARY SMOKING 96 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 REPORT]. Others have suggested, but have yet
to prove conclusively, the role of secondhand smoke in cancers of the paranasal sinus,
brain, breast, cervix and endocrine organs. Id. at 102-04. Inconclusive evidence also dem-
onstrates a link to cardiovascular disease. Id. at 105-06. In addition, a correlation has
been observed between increases in carbon monoxide poisoning, allergies and general
illness and the permeation of secondhand smoke. Cowan, supra note 5, at 393-97.
Recently, the findings of the 1986 REPORT were bolstered by a draft report released
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA-). The EPA's conclusions
mirror the 1986 REPORT and add more supporting studies and information. See Geoffrey
Cowley, Poison at Home and at Work, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992 (discussing the EPA
analysis and reporting that, if the EPA's edicts are adopted, "cigarette smoke could soon
enjoy the same status as arsenic, asbestos and coke-oven emissions").
34. One author has compiled the conclusions of more than seventy-five independent
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B. Regulatory History
In the nineteenth century, states regulated cigarette usage to
safeguard against the dangers of fire and disease and to reflect
current mores dubbing the habit socially and morally reprehensi-
ble.35 For instance, an early Massachusetts law banned smoking in
public streets due to the danger that a smoldering cigarette could
initiate a blaze.36 Louisiana prohibited smoking in streetcars due
to the discomfort and inconvenience the smoke caused patrons. 7
Possibly the most restrictive of the early laws was a Tennessee
statute that completely banned the sale of cigarettes within the
state. 38 The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the restriction as a
legitimate exercise of the state's police power.39 In doing so, it
took "judicial notice of the fact that [cigarette] use [was] harmful
and deleterious for all purposes" and, therefore, declared that ciga-
rettes were not legitimate articles of commerce.4"
By 1901, all but two states had considered legislation which
would restrict or prohibit the tobacco trade and a dozen states had
successfully implemented such measures.4 The attack continued
throughout the early 1900's with increasingly strict measures
studies and commentators criticizing the studies linking risk to passive smoke. See
TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 119-44. Problems identified in the studies range from inac-
curate premises and faulty test methods to suspect control groups. Id. In addition, there is
widespread disapproval of the proposition that cigarette smoke is a cause. Id. The authori-
ties cited did not find that this factor could be isolated or tagged as a proximate cause of
ill health. Id. With so many inaccuracies and lurking questions, these authorities argue
that it would be inaccurate or, at the very least, premature to conclude that passive smoke
entails a tangible harm. Id.
35. Sally A. Bude, Note, Smoking in Public: Nonsmokers' Rights and the Proposed
Iowa Clean Indoor Air Act, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 486 (1987-88).
36. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 231 (1847) (stating that the
statute's purpose was to safeguard Boston against fire damage).
37. See State v. Heidenhain, 7 So. 621, 621 (La. 1890) (attacking smoking as a nui-
sance and suggesting that "contaminated air" was dangerous to the health).
38. See Austin v. State, 48 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1898), aff'd sub nom., Austin v.
Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900). The Tennessee statute provided "that it shall be a misde-
meanor for any person . . . to sell, offer to sell, or to bring into the state for the pur-
pose of selling, giving away, or otherwise disposing of, any cigarettes, cigarette paper, or
substitute for the same .... Id
39. Id. at 309.
40. Id. at 306. Although it affirmed the Tennessee decision, the United States Supreme
Court declined to recognize that cigarettes were "'inherently bad and bad only.'" Austin
179 U.S. at 348.
41. Christopher Cobey, Note, The Resurgence and Validity of Antismoking Legislation,
7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 167, 169 (1974).
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passed to combat the smoker.42 This "anti-smoking" movement
peaked in 1921 .43 In that year alone, twenty-eight states consid-
ered ninety-two different anti-smoking bills and fourteen states suc-
ceeded in enacting such legislation." However, the heyday for'
anti-smoking laws was short-lived. By 1927, all anti-smoking leg-
islation had been removed from the books and from legislature
floors.4"
The backbone of the early anti-smoking crusade was crushed
by two developments, an imposition of judicial criticism and a
sway in public opinion. In 1911, the Kentucky Supreme Court
invalidated an ordinance which completely banned cigarette smok-
ing within the city's corporate limits.46 It found the restriction
unreasonable, arguing that "[to prohibit the smoking of cigarettes
in the citizen's own home or on other private premises is an inva-
sion of his right to control his own personal indulgences. 4 7 In
1914, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to uphold an ordinance
prohibiting the use of tobacco in any streets, parks or public build-
ings within the municipality. 8 Again, the legislation was heavily
criticized as "an attempt on the part of the municipality to regulate
and control the habits and practices of the citizen without any
reasonable basis for so doing." 9 Hence, it became apparent that
outright prohibitions would not be tolerated.
Coupled with these judicial decisions, public attitude helped
clinch the demise of the early anti-smoking movement. A number
of factors led to the acceptance of smoking as fashionable. First, as
American forces became entrenched in World War I, tobacco came
to be a soldier's staple.50 Second, Prohibition led to rebellion
against bans on consumptions of choice."' Third, cigarettes be-
came the darling of the blossoming new advertising industry. 2
Finally, state lawmakers discovered the tobacco industry as a major
source of tax revenue and quickly began to line the state coffers
42. Id. at 170-71.
43. Id. at 171.
44. Id. at 170-71.
45. Id.
46. Hershberg v. City of Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911).
47. Id. at 61.
48. City of Zion v. Behrens, 104 N.E. 836 (Ill. 1914).
49. Id. at 837-38.
50. Cobey, supra note 41, at 173.
51. Id. at 173-74.
52. Id. at 174.
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with monies from production and sales of cigarettes.53 Slowly but
surely, "[e]veryone started [smoking] and [smoking] everywhere,
creating an American custom which gave to the smoker consent to
smoke at will.
54
For the first seventy years of the twentieth century, the habit
was widely accepted." Yet, as a trend of health consciousness
grew, the public's perception of smoking changed once again.
Nonsmokers began to assert their desire to be free "from the an-
noyance and unhealthiness of smoke-polluted air.",56 Nonsmokers
were no longer willing to view the problem as that of smokers, nor
were they content to passively absorb contaminated air. Cigarettes
have come to be known not as a substance of choice, but as a
drug of addiction. 57 In the public's eyes, nicotine binds the smok-
er to the cigarette, and the cigarette in turn binds society to ill-
health and polluted air.58 "[T]he attention has shifted from the
smoker himself to the, effects that his habit imposes on others in
the immediate vicinity." '59
C. Responses to the Clean Air Movement
Recently, smoking has gained notoriety as a premier compo-
nent of environmental awareness. Air quality has emerged as a key
issue, implicating smoking as a producer of airborne contaminants.
In the quest for a healthier atmosphere, clean air activists now urge
the government to promulgate regulations that would reduce risks
associated with passive smoke inhalation and promote a healthier
environment.'
To a limited degree, nonsmokers have been successful. Most
states have sponsored some legislation restricting smokers' free-
53. Id.
54. Larry Kraft, Smoking in Public Places: Living with a Dying Custom, 64 N. DAK.
L. REv. 329, 336 (1988).
55. After the turn of the century, "Americans went on a tobacco smoking binge.- Id.
at 336. By 1963, "more than 50% of the adult men and over 30% of adult women in
the U.S. smoked cigarettes.- Id. at 336 n.23. See also Bude, supra note 35, at 487
(-Smoking became acceptable, and it was no longer considered morally reprehensible to
smoke.-).
56. Bude, supra note 35, at 483.
57. Kraft, supra note 54, at 336.
58. Id. at 338.
59. Vuich, supra note 6, at 611.
60. See Cowan, supra note 5, at 391 (discussing the concerns raised by non-smokers
before various courts and legislatures and the impact of those concerns on parent-child re-
lationships).
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dom.6" Efforts have been made to segregate the nonsmoker from
the smoker. Most notably, smoking has been prohibited in public
transportation, elevators, health care centers and recreational and
entertainment facilities. 2 Restrictions are also common in public
schools, state-owned buildings, restaurants, groceries and depart-
ment stores."' Additionally,, a smattering of jurisdictions specifical-
ly enumerate an exemplary list of smoke-free public places or
allow property owners the discretion to restrict smoking with the
placement of a "No Smoking" sign.6" The common basis for these
statutes is the elimination of a nuisance and the protection of pub-
lic health, safety and welfare.6"
In addition to these legislative prohibitions, common law re-
strictions have been imposed for public areas and in the workplace.
In the public sector, courts have sought to effectuate a comfortable
degree of segregation without imposing an outright ban.' Many
of the suits seeking an outright ban on smoking in public places
have employed various constitutional arguments, though none has
been successful. For instance, nonsmokers have argued that the
First Amendment protects their right to enter public buildings and
facilities freely to receive information without being subjected to
smoke-contaminated air.67 This argument fails because it ignores
the fact that information is not necessarily without cost.68 Just as
admission fees may prevent the flow of ideas originating at a pub-
lic event from reaching a given class of patrons, i.e., those who
cannot afford to pay the fee, cigarette smoke may deter reception
61. Eric J. Morrison, Comment, The Rights of Nonsmokers in Tennessee, 54 TENN. L.
REV. 671, 683 (1987); Swingle, supra note 28, at 454.
62. Swingle, supra note 28, at 454 (listing specific restrictions by state).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Morrison, supra note 61, at 683.
66. Mayhew, supra note 3, at 672 ("A state's smoking regulation should not attempt
to interpose a complete shield between smoke[rs] and nonsmokers, but to minimize their
contact where feasible.").
67. Federal Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 181, 183-84 (D.D.C. 1978) ("contend[ing] that their First Amendment right to peti-
tion their government for redress of grievances is infringed by the defendant's failure to
make safe smoke-filled hallways, corridors, and meeting rooms"); Gasper v. Louisiana
Stadium & Expo. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 717-18 (E.D. La. 1976) ('The nonsmokers
argue that the existence of tobacco smoke in the Superdome creates a chilling effect upon
the exercise of their First Amendment rights, since they must breathe that harmful smoke
as a precondition to enjoying events in the Superdome."); see also Reynolds, supra note
7, at 453 (arguing that smoke effectively bans nonsmokers from libraries, museums and
other such points of dissemination).
68. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718.
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by a certain portion of the audience.69 Since this obstacle does
not infringe upon First Amendment rights,7" neither does the First
Amendment argument advance the nonsmokers' cause.
Additionally, nonsmokers assert that being forced to breathe
smoke-filled air violates their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
rights to due process.7 Nonsmokers claim they are deprived of
life, liberty and property without due process of law because they
are forced to choose between remaining in a smoke-polluted area
and retreating from a place where they have a right to be.72 This
argument has also failed to rally judicial support since nonsmokers
are not considered a "captive audience." Moveover, there is no
constitutional right to a healthy environment.7 3 As one judge ob-
served, "[t]he liberty of each individual in a ... public place is
subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of oth-
ers." 74 In essence, that court's position was that nonsmokers are
not entitled to clean air, and to grant a request that would provide
a smoke-free environment would sabotage another's prerogative to
smoke.75
These and other similarly unsuccessful arguments76 compel
the conclusion that an outright ban on smoking is not likely to be
promulgated for public arenas.77
69. Id. The same argument could be made that alcohol vendors chill speech that might
otherwise reach patrons who curtail their patronage as a result of their opposition to the
sale of alcoholic beverages.
70. FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 184; Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718.
71. FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 184-85; Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718-21.
72. See FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 184-85 (arguing that nonsmokers were discriminated
against in a workplace which favored smokers); Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 716-17 (claiming
that smoking interfered with nonsmokers enjoyment of an event for which they paid an
admission fee).
73. FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 185; Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 720.
74. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 719 (quoting Pollack v. Public Util. Comm'n, 343 U.S.
451, 465 (1952)).
75. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 719-20; see also FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 184-85 (noting
that any governmental regulation must consider all of the interests concerned).
76. One commentator suggests an Equal Protection argument. However, because non-
smokers are not a suspect class and clean air is not a fundamental right, this argument is
weak. Nonsmokers would have to prove that states have no rational basis for allowing
smoking in public places. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 453. Another theory, rejected by a
state appellate court, argues that nonsmokers who are disabled by cigarette smoke should
be deemed legally handicapped and, therefore, treated as if unlawfully denied equal access
to public buildings. GASP v. Mecklenberg County, 256 S.E.2d 477, 478-79 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979).
77. This conclusion is consistent with judicial responses to the legislative bans imposed
in the early 1900's. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
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Nonsmokers have been somewhat more successful in the
workplace. The landmark decision in this area, Shimp v. New Jer-
sey Bell Telephone Co., imposed a duty on employers to provide
smoke-free workplaces.78 Reasoning that an employer has a com-
mon law duty to provide a safe working environment and that
secondhand smoke presents a significant health hazard, the New
Jersey Superior Court held that employers must act reasonably to
eliminate the risk. 9 Since the Shimp decision, several safeguards
have been introduced and judicially approved.8" While employers
are not required to maintain a completely smoke-free environment,
they must take reasonable steps to accommodate nonsmokers' com-
fort.8'
While the workplace and the public arena have been the fo-
rums most visible and profitable to the nonsmokers' cause, other
attacks have been launched. Grounded largely in tort, these attacks
have met with guarded optimism and virtually no judicial sup-
port.82 Nonetheless, the movement for clean air continues to prog-
78. 368 A.2d 408, 415-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
79. Id.
80. Employers cannot partition smoking and nonsmoking employees in such a way as
to adversely affect the compensation or job description of those requesting smoke-free air.
Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d -10, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Further, if alterna-
tive, comparable employment which provides a smokeless atmosphere is available, the
employer must either offer that alternative employment to the nonsmoking employee or
pay disability benefits. Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731, 739-40 (9th
Cir. 1982).
81. See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (refusing
to hold that employer had to provide a wholly smoke-free environment, particularly in
light of the attempts made to reduce the problem); Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research,
462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983) (refusing to require employer to adapt workplace to the particu-
lar sensibilities of an individual employee where defendant had taken steps to reduce
plaintiff's exposure to cigarette smoke).
Notwithstanding the judiciary's refusal to effectuate an absolute ban, some employers
have taken such measures on their own. Lately, employers have reacted to rising insur-
ance costs and increasing demands for sick days by instituting bans on tobacco usage,
both on and off the job. For example, in January 1987, the U.S. Gypsum Corporation,
now the USG Corporation, announced that smoking employees must either give up the
habit or find another job. Your Habit or Your Job, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1987, at A22.
The company's policy has sparked many questions regarding employment discrimination,
surveillance techniques both on and off the job, and privacy rights. See, e.g., Gary T.
Marx, The Company is Watching You Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1987, § 4, at 21
(describing various practices by which companies monitor employees both on and off the
employers' premises). Moreover, this far-reaching action is not going without official no-
tice or reaction. The Indiana legislature has introduced a bill which would prohibit termi-
nation of employees for off-the-job smoking. See James Grass, In-Puff, GANNETT NEws
SERV., Feb. 11, 1991. This legislation was introduced in response to an employee's suit
based on termination for off-the-job smoking. Id.
82. Nonsmokers have been encouraged to proceed on theories of nuisance, assault and
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ress. Some commentators assert that the movement's most powerful
weapon, a constitutional right to clean air, -exists but remains un-
veiled.83 First suggested in dicta,84 the right allegedly stems from
the penumbra of rights emanating from the Constitution. 5 Howev-
er, such penumbral protection has yet to be formally recognized.86
In fact, one federal district court has stated that "[t]o hold that
the ...Amendments recognize as fundamental the right to be free
from cigaret [sic] smoke would be to mock the lofty purposes of
such amendments and broaden their penumbral protections to un-
heard-of boundaries. 8 ' Almost certainly, recognition of a constitu-
tional right to a smoke-free environment is not forthcoming.88
II. THE VALIDITY OF REGULATING SMOKING IN
PRIVATE
The second antismoking crusade has reached a plateau; it has
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, strict liability and product liability. For
a discussion of these claims and their inherent limitations, see Reynolds, supra note 7, at
456-63, and Swingle, supra note 28, at 465-74.
Issues similar to those faced by passive smokers in establishing their rights to smoke
free air and in pursuing remedial actions against smokers must also be addressed by those
claiming legally cognizable harm to fetuses by mothers who smoked during pregnancy.
While some would not condone liability based on the use of legal substances such as
tobacco, alochol or caffeine, one scholar argues that, as women are becoming more legally
accountable for the health of their fetuses and "[a]s the evidence of harm to the fetus
from alochol and tobacco mounts, the distinction between *illegal' and 'legal' drugs be-
comes irrelevant." Kraft, supra note 54, at 348 n. 74. The viability of such actions claim-
ing fetal harm as a result of tobacco intake will depend upon the resolution of issues
similar to those addressed herein in the custody context.
83. See Cowan, supra note 5, at 399-402; Reynolds, supra note 7, at 450-55; Vuich,
supra note 6, at 614-18. The value of this proposed right, may be de minimis because a
constitutional violation depends upon state action. Arguably, however, the state's involve-
ment in the tobacco industry constitutes sufficient state action to assert a violation. See
Cowan, supra note 5, at 401; Reynolds, supra note 7, at 466.
84. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner, 1 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1640, 1641
(Mont. 1970) (noting that everyone has a right to be constitutionally protected against
government action that endangers their "personal state of life and health").
85. See Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Expo. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. La.
1976) (considering plaintiff's argument that penumbral protections of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments include the right to be free from tobacco smoke while in certain
areas).
86. Cowan, supra note 5, at 402.
87. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 721.
88. Morrison, supra note 61, at 676. But see Reynolds, supra note 7, at 444 (noting
that Arkansas and Rhode Island specifically recognize nonsmokers' right to clean air);
Mayhew, supra note 3, at 677 (noting that the Illinois Constitution guarantees each indi-
vidual the right to a healthful environment, but conceding that the provision was probably
not intended to aid citizens in pursuing smokers).
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gained as much ground as the first movement had before it was
stifled by a sway in public opinion and by court-imposed bound-
aries.8 9 The question looming is whether or not the narrow regu-
lations established in government facilities and workplaces can
carry over into a previously uncharted area - the private home.
A. Constitutional Inquiry
In assessing the level of constitutional protection afforded
cigarette users, the primary question is whether smoking in one's
own home constitutes a fundamental right. Restriction of purely
private smoking, as in the De Beni Souza case,' implicates two
areas of constitutional concern: the right to smoke and the right to
privacy. This note considers each category to determine the exis-
tence and derivation of such rights, the degree of protection they
command and their application to smoking in the home.
1. Definition and Standard
Fundamental rights include those specifically enumerated in
the Constitution as well as those referenced by the Ninth
Amendment.9 If the right is enumerated, then it clearly warrants
constitutional protection. If the Constitution does not mention the
activity, then it is necessary to determine whether the right is fun-
damental by implication. The Ninth Amendment is said to grant
the power to look beyond the written words of the Constitution to
the intent of the framers and the conscience of the people.' The
liberties inferred through this process are referred to as penumbral
89. Once again, restrictions have succeeded only to the extent they are reasonable and
limited in operation. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
91. MICHAEL F. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 45, 46 (1972). The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend IX.
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citing the right of "pri-
vacy and repose" as emanating from the penumbra of guaranteed rights); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (-Liberty' is a conception that some-
times gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees or from experience
with the requirements of a free society." (citation omitted)); see also Russell L. Caplan,
The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE 243, 245 (Randy E. Barrett ed., 1989) (presenting Justice Goldberg's argument
that the framers of the Ninth Amendment believed there are extra, unenumerated rights
which should be awarded fundamental protection). But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 521-22
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not find any fundamental rights
beyond those found in the written words of the Constitution).
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rights of the Constitutional Amendments.9 a
Inquiries into the scope and contents of the penumbra have
been posed in a variety of ways. Courts may consider whether a
freedom "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,' . . . "94
whether it is rooted in the "traditions and [collective] conscience of
our people, . . . ,95 or whether it is consistent with one's com-
mon "experience with the requirements of a free society." 9, Fun-
damental freedoms are also framed as those which are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty ... Moreover, the right sought
should enjoy current reverence and vitality if it is to be afforded
constitutional protection.98
When a state enacts a law that restricts an individual's enjoy-
ment of a fundamental right, the constitutionality of that law may
be challenged. 99 If the right is fundamental, the law will be up-
held only if the governmental intrusion serves a compelling interest
that cannot be achieved in a less restrictive manner.0" If the
right is not fundamental, the restriction will be upheld so long as it
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'t '
93. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
94. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926)), quoted in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
95. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
96. Id. at 493-94 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting)).
97. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
98. See Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1179 (1980) (noting that past vitality of a fundamental right is irrelevant,
since the right must enjoy current acceptance); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191 (1986) (cautioning that rights not expressly identified in the Constitution must
encompass more than the imposition of judges' own values).
99. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 ("[State goals] . . . may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.-)
(quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (citation omitted)).
100. For examples of statutes that did not advance a compelling interest, see Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (state unemployment benefits stat-
ute infringing on religious freedom); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state
statute regulating marriage); and Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (state statute forbidding use of
contraceptives).
101. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). Some commen-
tators believe that the rational basis standard of review should be strengthened to require
courts to examine the purposes for the challenged regulation, looking beyond the proffered
justifications to the validity and utility of the restriction. STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEw
RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1987). Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
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2. The Right To Smoke
The first consideration in determining the validity of any
restriction is whether the activity itself invites constitutional protec-
tion."° Many people, particularly smokers, assert that the very
concept of personal freedom includes a fundamental right to
smoke.10 3 Where and when this idea took root is unclear. Some
suggest that its origin is in custom." Others assert that it derives
from the penumbral right to determine one's 6wn lifestyle and to
control one's own life. 5 Still others rely upon the constitutional-
ly recognized zone of privacy and integrity surrounding the human
body, guarding against all intrusions except those that mitigate a
"clear and present" danger.'06
In 1986, the "right" to smoke gained some notoriety by its
mention in a Surgeon General's report. 07 The report stated that
"[t]he right of smokers to smoke ends where their behavior affects
the health and well-being of others .... ""' Although the dis-
tinction may have been the result of careless semantics, the report
lends at least rhetorical credence to the concept that a right to.
smoke exists and intrusion upon it is proper only in response to
demonstrable harm.
To date, courts have adopted neither the language of custom
nor the arguments of bodily integrity as creating a right to smoke.
In one recent opinion, a federal circuit court squarely faced the
right's existence." Rejecting arguments that the right was em-
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (suggesting in dictum that regulations affecting "quasi-
suspect" classes be subjected to heightened scrutiny).
102. The degree of protection to be afforded smokers in their own homes is discussed
in the next section. See infra text accompanying notes 119-34. This section addresses only
the right of individuals to participate in the activity itself.
103. Kraft, supra note 54, at 338-39.
104. Id. at 338 n.28.
105. H. Ward Classen, Restricting the Right to Smoke in Public Areas: Whose Rights
Should Be Protected?, 38 SYRACuSF L. REV. 831, 835" (1987) (relying upon Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973)).
106. Id. at 837 (relying upon the holdings in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 481 (1965)). Note, however, that the boundary
lines delineating this zone of personal bodily right are not impenetrable. For example, in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court restricted a woman's right to an abortion
and, thus, her absolute right to control her own body.
107. 1986 REPORT, supra note 33, at xii.
108. Id. (emphasis supplied).
109. Gruesendorf v. Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1987). The right
was asserted by an Oklahoma firefighter in response to a city policy denying trainees the
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bodied by liberty and privacy interests, the court held that neither
the Constitution's words nor its meaning guaranteed a right to
smoke."1 ° Currently, no court has disagreed and no constitutional
protection has been extended to smoking.
3. The Right To Privacy
Although smoking itself is not guaranteed constitutional pro-
tection, restrictions on purely private smoking may nevertheless
enjoy Constitutional protection through the right to privacy. One of
the most widely-recognized emanations from the Bill of Rights, the
right to privacy, envelops the "moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not to others nor to society as a whole.""' The
realm of privacy is elite in that it includes only a select group of
rights; only those personal rights which are adjudged
"'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' fall
within this exclusive realm." 2 Hence, a smoker will be afforded
heightened, protection only if the act of smoking is subsumed by
some other constitutional right." 3 Since there are no prior cases
on point, the inquiry must focus on the general boundaries estab-
lished in this area.
Succinctly stated, "the Constitution embodies a promise that a
certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely
beyond the reach of government.""' 4 This right to privacy, how-
right to smoke, on or off the job, for one year. Id. at 540.
110. Id. at 542-43. See also Cowan, supra note 5, at 415 (stating that neither smokers
nor nonsmokers have constitutional protection).
111. Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 288, 288 (1977) (quoted in
Thomburg v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747, 777 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). From a Lockean perspective, the right to privacy embodies the
maxim that the government cannot regulate an individual's autonomy and liberty any more
than could his neighbors. Id. at 334. The exact substantive protection offered in the con-
text of the right to privacy is difficult to quantify because the right itself is an emerging
concept not yet fully defined.
112. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
113. Recall that the concept of smoking itself as a textually supplied or inferred consti-
tutional right has been rejected. See supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
114. Thomburg v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986) (citations omitted). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the right to privacy has both decisional and spatial
aspects); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (arguing that the Framers "'sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations-)
(emphasis added) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
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ever, is not absolute. It extends only to personal autonomy in
making certain important- decisions" 5 and in forming certain inti-
mate relationships. 16 Notwithstanding its widespread acceptance,
the right to privacy has yet to gain universal recognition. Some
judges, including former Supreme Court Justices Black and Stew-
art," 7 have been hesitant in accrediting the unenumerated con-
cept.1
8
The question at hand is whether the realm of privacy, in its
current state, embodies a personal right which would protect smok-
ing in the home. The inquiry that follows begins with the protec-
tion offered smoking solely because it is practiced in the home.
The discussion then expands to examine the privacy right which
attaches to smoking itself and to the smoker's parental status. If
one of these three sources, the home, the activity or the participant,
guarantees the right to smoke in the home, then such behavior
cannot be restricted absent a compelling government interest.
a. The Private Home
There seems to be a common belief that the home is secure
from government intrusion as a matter of course - that it provides
a place to think, to do, and simply to be, undaunted by societal
morality and unmolested by state intrusion. "' Historically, this
115. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) ("The cases sometimes charac-
terized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of inter-
ests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another
is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."); Bowers,
478 U.S. at 190-91 (rejecting the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct be-
tween two consenting adults is constitutionally protected).
116. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (stating that relationships such as those formed in
marriage, family and childrearing are protected); Classen, supra note 105, at 834 (arguing
that the right to privacy does not depend upon a particular place, but upon certain pro-
tected intimate relationships).
117. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I
like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that
government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional pro-
vision."); id. at 503 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that there is no right to privacy).
118. See Bennett B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RE-
TAINED BY THE PEOPLE, 107, 125 (Randy E. Barrett ed., 1989) ('While the courts seem
to feel that it should exist, there is a great timidity and lack of forthrightness in the
protection of this right, because its existence is not to be found in the written and enu-
merated law.").
119. The home and its curtilage are places to which significant measures of privacy and
security attach. See 'Rosemarie Falcone, Note, California v. Ciraola: The Demise of Pri-
vate Property, 47 LA. L. REv. 1365, 1368 (1987) (exploring the protection against war-
rantless searches offered the home and the area surrounding it).
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idea derives from the conception that a .man's home is his castle,
deserving special immunity from outside intervention. 20
Arguably, this concept of absolute solicitude was officially
adopted in amendments to the Constitution. The Third Amendment
guarantees that a man's home may not be confiscated for govern-
ment use;' 2' the Fourth Amendment protects the home, person
and property from unreasonable searches and seizures." 2 It seems
logical that the unwritten agenda in adopting these amendments
was to safeguard the home as a place beyond the reach of govern-
ment disturbance - a place in which each man is free to do as he
pleases. 1
23
Indeed, prominent dissenting opinions cite the Third and
Fourth Amendments as the basis for recognition of an umbrella of
rights encompassing personal freedoms within the home. 124 At the
very least, these amendments lend credence to the argument that
the home should provide some degree of shelter for self-expression
and autonomy. Thus, smoking could logically acquire immunity
from unreasonable restriction when done in the home, even though
120. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Just as the right to pri-
vacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in specific
behavior, so too, protecting the physical integrity of the home is more than merely a
means of protecting specific activities that often take place there."); Caplan, supra note
92, at 321 (noting that "[p]rivacy has historical authenticity"); see also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ('I think the sweep of the Court's deci-
sions, under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, amply shows that the Constitu-
tion protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever
character.").
121. The Third Amendment provides: "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to
be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
122. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
123. "While this textual warrant is concededly attenuated, it is safe to derive from the
context and intent of these enumerated rights a concern that individuals, in their homes
and with respect to their persons and effects, remain free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion." Caplan, supra note 92, at 321-22.
124. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be secure in one's own house as the most textual constitutional provision
with respect to the right to privacy); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (citing the combination of the Third and Fourth Amendments as creating a
constitutional right to privacy).
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smoking itself is not a fundamental right.
Notwithstanding this textual support, the home itself does not
necessarily elicit a heightened degree of protection. The Court has
constructively held that the walls of a house are neither a necessity
for nor a guarantee of the right to privacy, a conclusion which
derives from a comparison of the holdings in Griswold v. Connect-
icut t"5 and Bowers v. Hardwick.
t26
Considered a landmark decision in the development of the
right to privacy, the Griswold court invalidated a law banning the
use of contraceptive devices. 27 Viewed alone, the Court's reason-
ing seems to support the idea that protection should be attached to
the home itself.28 The Court concluded that the sanctity of the
marital relationship fell within a "zone of privacy."' 29 The statute
making contraception illegal permitted an unwarranted trespass into
the marital bedroom. 3 ' In identifying a zone of privacy, a por-
tion of the Court's reasoning focused on the home.' From this
precedent, a strong argument can be made that the home prompts
the protection and that any activity therein would be guarded by
this same auspice of privacy.
However, twenty-one years later, the Court's holding in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick made clear that the privacy to be revered was that
existing in the relationship between husband and wife and not that
provided by the walls of the home.'32 The underlying facts of
125. 381 U.S. 398 (1965).
126. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
127. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. Note that the Court had previously avoided the ques-
tion when it refused standing in a similar action regarding a statutory ban on contracep-
tive counselling. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(finding that despite the majority's avoidance of the issue, the confines of the home do
protect the right to privacy).
128. The Court concluded that the use of contraceptives in the marital setting "concerns
a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). In preceding paragraphs,
the Court had discussed the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution and
their link to the home as a fortress against certain state intrusions. Id. at 484-85. This
acknowledgment of the home in the context of the constitutional provisions most directly
supporting the right to privacy establishes judicial support for protecting activities in the
home solely on the basis of their occurrence in the home. See supra notes 121-24 and
accompanying text.
129. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
130. Id. The injustice of this statute was further exaserbated by its overbreadth since
law, which was intended to deter illicit sexual activity, failed to distinguish between mar-
ried and unmarried consumers. Id.
131. See id.
132. 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
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Bowers mirrored those in Griswold with two important differences:
(1) the criminal conduct alleged was the sexual act (sodomy) rather
than the prescription of contraceptives and (2) the parties were
homosexual lovers rather than marital partners. 3 The Court held
that the privacy associated with the home did not secure the free-
dom to engage in a "publicly condemned" activity, sodomy." 4
Taken together, the Griswold and Bowers holdings upset the
concept of the home as a safe harbor of absolute privacy. While it
has historical validity as a refuge against societal interference, the
home, in and of itself, is not a legal bar to state intrusion into
personal activities. Behavior conducted in the home is protected
only to the extent that the conduct or the actor is protected. Smok-
ing, therefore, does not command heightened protection merely be-
cause it takes place in the home.
b. The Specific Conduct
If behavior at home is not necessarily protected from govern-
ment interference, what benefit does the right to privacy offer?
Because it is neither enumerated nor explicitly defined, the right's
substance must be gleaned from case law. The right to privacy has
been asserted in two distinct contexts, associations (including both
relationships and decisions) and possessions. As the act of smoking
involves both a decision to partake in an activity and the posses-
sion of cigarettes, consideration of both aspects of privacy is neces-
sary.
The right to privacy has been interpreted by the courts to
extend only to the performance of personal acts and to decisions
within certain contexts.'35 The difficulty arises in determining
which personal acts and decisions deserve protected status. The
right to privacy has been interpreted to include personal choices
with respect to marriage, 36  procreation, 37  contraception,
38
133. Id. at 187-88.
134. Id. at 195-96.
135. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (noting that the zone of privacy
protects a person's "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions"); Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1261-63 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (recognizing that
of the right to privacy exists in the context of certain interpersonal decisions such as in
matters of marriage and family life); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 626 (E.D. Va.
1973) (noting that the right to privacy has been extended only to acts and decisions such
as those involving parent and child, husband and wife, and mother and fetus), aff'd, 539
F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
136. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long
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family relations, 39 child rearing and education." ° The Court
has held that the right focuses particularly upon matters of mar-
riage and family life.'4 '
In defining this realm of protection, the Court has taken care
to distinguish truly traditional values from incidental notions of
privacy. As noted above, Griswold v. Connecticut, the landmark
case espousing the "zone of privacy," 42 recognized marriage as
an institution of sufficient magnitude to support the privacy
right. 43 Subsequent decisions made clear that it was the essence
of the marital relationship that warranted protection, not the activi-
ties incidental to marriage.'" Essentially, the right to privacy de-
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.-).
137. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("The decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of... constitutionally pro-
tected choices."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (stating that the
power to sterilize infringes on one of the basic civil rights and procreation is "fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the race").
138. See Thornburg v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747,
759-65 (1986) (allowing the state to distribute information informing a woman about
abortions, but disallowing inclusion of data which would influence her choice); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (holding the decision to terminate a pregnancy within
the zone of privacy, but subject to regulation in certain instances); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating a statute which distinguished between married and
unmarried women regarding the legality of obtaining contraceptives).
139. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (acknowledging that the
private realm of family life is to be respected and protected against interference from the
state).
140. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that compul-
sory public school education law infringes liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding it
the natural duty of parents to educate their children within certain limitations proscribed
by the state); see also Cleveland Ed. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
(invalidating maternity leave policy that infringes on freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life). This prong of the relational protection is discussed further in
the following subsection dealing with the smoker as a parent. See infra text accompanying
notes 171-200.
141. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983).
142. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964).
143. The Griswold Court stated that "[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred . . . . [I]t is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Id. at 486. See
also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the freedom to choose a marital partner).
144. Consistent with this notion, the Bowers Court held that sodomy, even as the "natu-
ral" extension of a homosexual relationship, was not an activity protected by a logical
extension of the marital and familial privacy decisions. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191 (1986). Dissenters urged that the right to privacy encompassed more than just
the freedom to privately engage in currently accepted or morally approved practices. Id. at
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pended upon the judiciary's determination of whether or not the
underlying relationship warranted protection.
1 45
The Court has also held that the right to privacy extends to
certain personal decisions. One carefully guarded personal choice is
the right to marry. The Court has held fundamental the right to
decide when'" and whom 47 to marry. Similarly, the state may
not impinge upon a person's decisions with respect to procre-
ation 4  and contraception. 149  Additionally, decisions about fami-
ly living arrangements are so personal that they are beyond judicial
or legislative intervention." ° Thus, choices made regarding famil-
ial associations are granted a significant degree of deference and
respect.1
5
'
The task at hand, then, is to determine whether this right to
associational privacy shields smoking in the home. A key consid-
eration in this analysis focuses upon whether the Constitution's
framers specifically intended to safeguard tobacco use'52 or, alter-
199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in particular, argued that the majori-
ty had incorrectly characterized the case "'to be about the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy,'" rather than a case about "'the right to be let alone.'" Id. at 199. See also
Classen, supra note 105, at 834 (-This right of privacy is not concerned with a particular
place, but with protected intimate relationships.").
145. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (cautioning the judiciary
against giving effect to or tolerating private bias and prejudice); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (warning against imposing
the values of white suburbia on the rest of society).
146. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (invalidating a state law re-
quiring state permission for person delinquent in making support payments to marry).
147. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (declaring marriage to be "one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival") (quoting Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
148. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1941) (striking down a statute au-
thorizing sterilization of habitual criminals because the law "deprive[d] certain individuals
of a right . . . basic to the perpetuation of a race - the right to have offspring");
Thornburg v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986)
("The States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life,
to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1971) (holding that the right to privacy includes the right to terminate a pregnancy un-
less the fetus has reached viability, at which time the state's interest becomes compelling).
149. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1964); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1971).
150. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1976) (overturning a
statutory scheme by which certain classes of relatives.were prohibited from sharing living
quarters).
151. Id. at 499. "'This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
152. One argument favoring the right to smoke is the long-standing existence of the
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natively, whether smoking is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" 153 and thus deserving protection as a fundamentally pri-
vate prerogative.
Arguably, protection of smoking at home would reinforce
"'the individual's right to make certain unusually important deci-
sions that would affect his own, or his family's destiny"' and to
retain his autonomy in deciding how to live his own life. t" Al-
though smoking may not be universally sanctioned, it continues to
be a pervasive habit in this country. 55 Nonetheless, the right to
privacy has yet to encompass freedoms similar to tobacco use.
Thus far, the United States Supreme Court has included only those
activities and relationships which relate to marriage and the family
in an intimate and procreational sense, failing to consider, much
less extend protection to, personal freedom in more trivial con-
texts. 
15 6
Smoking may appear to be a protected activity because of its
historical background, but it fails to meet the crucial test implied
by the Court's privacy decisions of vitality and necessity in rela-
tion to the intimacies of private life. Smoking is not an integral
and necessary human function like procreation 57 or an intimate
personal choice like contraception.5'5 Historical acceptance of an
activity alone is insufficient to support a claim for constitional
protection of the activity performed in the seclusion of the
home.'59 Thus, smoking is not a protected activity under the
tobacco industry and the smoking custom. Cigarette smoking, a custom pre-dating the
establishment of this country, is firmly rooted in societal tradition. Given tobacco's wide-
spread use at the time of the Constitution's creation, it is unlikely that the framers meant
to exclude it from the home. See 1964 REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.
153. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
154. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Recall the Kentucky Supreme Court's reaction to a complete, city-wide ban on
smoking. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. In the Kentucky court's words, "[t]o
prohibit the smoking of cigarettes in the citizen's home or on other private premises is an
invasion of his right to control his own personal indulgences." Hershberg v. City of
Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985, 986 (Ky. 1911).
155. As of 1984, one third of all Americans used tobacco products. Reynolds, supra
note 7, at 435. In fact, one author suggests that "even the most zealous anti-smoker cru-
saders would be offended by a law banning smoking in [the] private home[] ... 
TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 45.
156. See National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Bell, 488 F. Supp.
123, 133 (D.C. 1980) (-[Simoking [marijuana] does not involve the important values
inherent in questions concerning marriage, procreation, or child rearing.").
157. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 317 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
158. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
159. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (relying on historical condem-
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associational prong of the right to privacy.
Smoking might also be afforded constitutional protection under
a line of cases guarding the private possession of certain items
which are forbidden in public." For example, although obscenity
can be appropriately proscribed in public theaters,' 6' a citizen
may legally engage in obscene behavior and consume such mate-
rials within a private home. 62 Where materials themselves are
protected by the First Amendment, private possession of themis
protected as well.' 63
Conversely, where the "contraband" is unworthy of First
Amendment protection, there is no special protection for its use in
the home. In National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws
v. Bell, a district court refused to grant special immunity to persons
privately possessing or using marijuana."6 It held that the choice
to use marijuana was not worthy of constitutional protection be-
cause it was a "recreational" choice, not an intimate decision. 65
Furthermore, since the effects of marijuana use extend well beyond
the privacy of the home, the choice elicits public concern, thereby
forfeiting the user's potential protection.'66 Thus, the right to use
or possess certain items does not turn on the location of those
nation of sodomy and homosexuality to justify decision upholding prosecution of those
engaging in sodomy at home) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding fact that
states had historically prohibited abortions insufficient to uphold intrusion into women's
privacy).
160. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (considering the state's power to
regulate obscenity in private homes).
161. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) ("The states have a long
recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce
and in all places of public accommodation.").
162. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 (-Whatever the power of the state to control public dis-
semination of ideas inimical to public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legisla-
tion on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.").
163. Id. at 559-60; see also Feldman v. Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div.
1974) (finding a mother's possession of obscene literature beyond the reach of state con-
trol).
164. 488 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.C. 1980). See also Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244, 246
(Fla. 1969) (Reasoning that stimulation via consumption did not garner First Amendment
protection, the court rejected the argument that marijuana fulfilled the user's "intellectual
and emotional needs."). But see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (holding that
the right of privacy protected adult use and possession of marijuana in the home in ac-
cordance with the unique provisions of the Alaska state constitution).
165. Bell, 488 F. Supp. at 132-33; cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986)
(refusing to immunize otherwise illegal behavior (sodomy) simply because it was conduct-
ed in the home).
166. Borras, 229 So. 2d at 246.
1992] SMOKING AND PARENTING 1049
items. Tobacco products, though legal, are like marijuana in that
they enjoy no constitutional protection. 67
Because smoking is neither fundamentally protected nor social-
ly outcast, it falls somewhere between the intimate decisions and
possessions specifically guaranteed protection and the prohibited
harmful activities expressly forbidden.1 68  Freedoms such as this,
though not elevated to a fundamental level, do not invite uninhibit-
ed governmental interference. They simply fall into a category
which exacts a less stringent inquiry.169 The state's intrusion is
justified so long as a rational basis for such action exists.'70
c. The Participant's Status
Parent-smokers may also qualify for some protection from the
specialized right to privacy traditionally afforded the activity of
parenting. Every parent has a fundamental right to "the companion-
ship, care, custody and management of his or her children."
71
Arguably, this right includes the choice to smoke in the child's
presence. If the liberties available in the guise of parenthood in-
clude the act of smoking in the child's presence, constitutional
protection will attach.
The boundaries of parental rights are quite broad. Parents owe
167. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
168. While not precisely addressed, cigarettes may be accorded heightened deference due
to the fact that they have yet to be outlawed. See Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 552-553
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that, while the privacy of the home is not
absolute, prohibiting that which is not traditionally criminal is preposterous).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
170. The rational basis test demands only that the state have some logical foundation
for its action taken in furtherance of a legitimate goal. For instance, in Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U.S. 635 (1986), the Court considered the distinction between distant and close rela-
tives in construing the term "household" for purposes of determining family eligibility for
federal food stamps. The Court upheld the state's allocation of assistance against an Equal
Protection challenge because it found that the state could reasonably have determined
close relatives would budget for, purchase and prepare their meals as a unit. Id. at 638-
43.
Arguably, restrictions on smoking in private do not even survive the rational basis
test. According to one district court judge,
if this court were to recognize that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
vide the judicial means to prohibit smoking, it would be creating a legal ave-
nue, heretofore unavailable, through which an individual could attempt to regu-
late the social habits of his neighbor. This court is not prepared to accept the
proposition that life-tenured members of the federal judiciary should engage in
such basic adjustments of individual behavior and liberties
Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Expo. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1976).
171. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
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a legal and moral duty of care to their children; they are responsi-
ble for their children's development, education, support and well-
being."7 These obligations are accompanied by the right- to raise
children "according to the dictates of [the parents'] own conscienc-
es. 1 73 The decisions made by adults in their role as parents are
accorded great deference and are protected against all but compel-
ling state interests.t 74  Effectively, a shield has been erected
around the family which recognizes its privacy, autonomy and
integrity.175 "
However, this territory surrounding the family is neither abso-
lute nor impenetrable. Because children lack maturity and standing,
the state has been entrusted with protection of their interests. 76
The state has a duty to supervise parental activity and to enforce
the requirement that certain obligations be fulfilled.'" Where
there is clear evidence of unfitness, the state can intercede and
usurp the parents' right to make decisions for their children.17
The question then is whether smoking presents a viable basis
for intervention in the parent-child relationship. Does the presence
of cigarettes supply a sufficient justification for the state to over-
ride parental discretion? Because it has been alleged that smoking
172. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978).
173. Id. The Massachusetts court noted that the parental right of control is -akin to a
trust 'subject to . . . [a] correlative duty to care for and protect the child, and . . . [ter-
minable] by [the parents'] failure to discharge their obligations.' Id. at 1063 (quoting
Richards v. Forrest, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (Mass. 1932)).
174. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (noting that there is a "'realm of family life
which the state cannot enter' without a substantial justification" (quoting Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)
(noting that freedom of personal choice in family matters is a protected liberty).
175. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1974) (noting the many
cases acknowledging a privacy right in family life); Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F. Supp.
383, 390 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (acknowledging a common law right to familial privacy).
176. See Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1056 (noting that at some point, the
state's interest in enforcing the child's rights sufficiently outweighs the family interest to
justify intervention).
177. See Coler, 585 F. Supp. at 390 ("The State, in its role as parens patriae, is the
ultimate protector of the rights of children, and may act to provide for their health, safety
and welfare when the parents fail to do so.").
178. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (holding that the state has no
interest in separating a fit father from his child). But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) (disallowing a child's removal from his foster family's care because his
natural father reentered his life only after being notified of the child's pending adoption
and because the child's removal would destroy the adoptive family unit). Note that the
Quilloin court's concern was with the family unit and not with the biological bond, high-
lighting the importance of the parent-child bond to the court's decision.
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is morally and physically harmful, cases setting a standard with
respect to the child's growth and well-being may provide an appro-
priate analogy.
From a moral standpoint, parents have been given a great deal
of latitude in guiding their children. In the area of education, for
example, discretion has proven an effective weapon against state
intervention. Courts have recognized parental responsibility for the
child's intellectual stimulation and have entrusted parents with
nurturing intellectual growth. Parental freedom encompasses the
right to demand that the child is educated in a certain manner 79
according to a certain curriculum."' 0 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has approved contravention of state mandatory attendance
policies by parents striving to instill in their children dedication to
a particular religion or lifestyle.' 8 '
Subversion of parental authority with respect to smoking may
invite state intervention in other areas. If parents are not free to
smoke, will they next be declared unfit to determine what children
listen to on the radio or watch on television? Will a societal move-
ment override parental discretion concerning what children eat, how
late they stay up, or in what sorts of activities they participate?
While a substantial number of people may hold smoking to be
immoral and unsuitable for impressionable youth, this judgment
alone should not be grounds for contraction of firmly-rooted paren-
tal rights.
Just as parents are permitted to choose children's educational
experiences and religious upbringing, they should be able to select
the child's moral influences as well. Even if some members of
society believe smoking to be morally corrupt, parents are entitled
to control their children's intellect and morality. If parents wish to
exemplify the propriety of adult smoking, they should be free to
179. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing the right
to send one's child to private schools as within the realm of parental discretion).
180. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (permitting parents to have their
children schooled in German).
181. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court allowed parents to violate
compulsory schooling statutes in order to raise children in the Amish tradition. To qualify
for this exemption, the Court required that parents demonstrate the existance of a well-
established and identifiable religious sect, the sincerity of their beliefs, the vital interrela-
tionship of their religious beliefs and mode of life, and the comparability of their pro-
posed educational scheme to the state minimum standards. Id. at 235-36. While the Court
is willing to defer to the parent's values and decisions in determining the child's educa-
tional course, it will permit avoidance of statutory minimums only where the religious
beliefs are well-established and the child's education appropriately achieved.
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do so, just as they are free to have their children taught the Ger-
man language"8 2 or the Amish culture."8 3 From a purely moral
point of view, it seems that smoking should be included in the
broad category of choices left exclusively to parental discretion -
parents should be able to choose whether to smoke in their
childrep's presence.
If parents are not granted the freedom to choose these sorts of
influences, how will the state deal with the problems posed by
enforcement and supervision?'s" What sorts of policing capabili-
ties would have to be granted for the state effectively to oversee
children's moral upbringing? Some sort of state guardian would
have to be ever-present in the home watching for the first sign of
smoke, checking the hour of bedtime, noting the acceptability of
games and hobbies, and so forth. For a society that prides itself on
individual freedom, this sort of intervention is unacceptable.
While smoking poses more than a moral dilemma, a similar
pattern of deference can be found with respect to parental control
over children's physical condition. Parents are granted a great deal
of leeway as long as the child's life is not threatened. In this re-
gard, a logical analogy to the smoking issue lies in the standard
articulated with respect to the parent's duty to provide proper med-
ical care. On one hand, the state has an important interest in the
health and safety of its citizens. t8  On the other hand, "courts
have shown great reluctance to overturn parental objections to
medical treatment... ,,tI6 due in large part to the subjectivity
involved in selecting the proper course of care. 87 Intervention is
proper only when parents are unwilling to provide necessary medi-
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. This issue echoes one of the Court's concerns in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). In questioning the validity of a law banning the use of contraceptive de-
vices, the Court querried whether society "[wiould ... allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?- Id. at
485.
185. See, e.g., Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (upholding a
compulsory vaccination statute over parents' objection because of the interest of other
school children with whom unvaccinated children would necessarily mingle).
186. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978) (acting re-
luctantly in taking custody of a child requiring life-saving leukemia treatment even upon a
showing that the child would have a ninety percent chance of recovery).
187. See In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (N.Y. 1979). (noting that a decision
with respect to the proper course of medical care is one which is "fraught with subjectiv-
ity").
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cal treatment and only when the untreated condition seriously
threatens the child's life.'88 Where there is no immediate and
definite threat to the child's life, parental discretion warrants defer-
ence.
189
The decision to order medical treatment over parental objec-
tion has proven difficult for the courts to make. Each decision
necessarily implicates the weighty interests of parent, child, and
state, respectively."9° "Courts which have considered the question,
after balancing these three interests, uniformly have decided that
State intervention is appropriate where the medical treatment sought
is necessary to save the child's life." 9' Facing the issue for the
first time in Custody of a Minor, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
ordered chemotherapy for a child over the parents' objections only
after considering with "great deference" the parental prerogative in
medical care cases.' 9 Central to the court's conclusion was the
fact that the illness was life-threatening and the prescribed treat-
188. In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982) ('The right to practice religion
freely does not include the right or liberty to expose the community or the child to ill
health or death.-); People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774 (Ill. 1952)
(ordering blood transfusion to counteract a life threatening RH abnormality), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757 (N.J. 1962) (authorizing. a
blood transfusion to correct a chronic lack of oxygen for a critically ill child), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Vasko, 263 N.Y.S. 552, 555-56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933)
(ordering surgical removal of eye to terminate progression of a life threatening disease);
In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 129 (Ohio C.P. 1962) (ordering blood transfusions for badly
burned child based on signs of steady deterioration and medical opinion predicting immi-
nent death); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (TeX. Civ. App. 1947) (divesting
a mother of parental rights when her method of faith healing and prayer failed to stay
the effects of debilitating and life-endangering swelling of her child's knee); see also
Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d 140 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961) (authorizing a
blood transfusion for a child yet to be born based on evidence of a life threatening RH
condition which had caused the death of several siblings).
, 189. See Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014-15 (refusing to override parents' decision to
seek nutritional therapy for a child with Hodgkin's disease where there was no immediate
peril); In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (N.Y. 1955) (holding operation to correct a
cleft palate not in court's discretion, but in parents'); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 388
(Pa. 1972) (refusing to intervene in case of child who could not stand due to paralytic
scoliosis); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. & C. 561, 563 (1912) (refusing to order corrective
surgery even though rickets would cripple child for life); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765,
768 (Wash. 1942) (deferring to parents' discretion because physical deformity did not
threaten child's life). But see hi re Rotkowitz, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625-27 (N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1941) (holding interference proper whenever there is a risk to the child's health, limb,
person, or future and ordering correction of a gross physical deformity to protect the
child's sense of security and feeling of peer similarity).
190. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1061-62 (Mass. 1978).
191. Id. at 1062.
192. Id.
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ment was more than a promise "merely to prolong life where there
is no hope of recovery."' 93 Moreover, to justify the order, the
Massachusetts court weighed the factors in terms of the child's best
interests, refusing to hold as dispositive the life-threatening nature
of the illness and the parental refusal to take corrective action."9
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered a blood trans-
fusion for a child suffering from a chronic lack of oxygen only
after assuring itself that "the interests of society as a whole neces-
sitate[d this] course of action. . . [and were] paramount to certain
personal freedoms."" 5
In contrast, In re Hofbauer presented the New York Court of
Appeals with a situation involving a child suffering from
Hodgkin's disease and a physician advocating radiation thera-
py-t96 Because the parents were following an alternative course of
nutritional therapy which had gained some medical recognition and
which did not place the child's life in jeopardy, the appellate court
deferred to the parents' judgment. 97 Noting that a decision as to
proper medical care is "fraught with subjectivity," the Hofbauer
court observed that parental authority to act on behalf of children
demands protection in all but the most serious cases.' 98
Cigarette smoke poses no immediate or demonstrable threat to
a child's well-being. Therefore, smoking does not provide the dis-
positive factor of an imminently endangered life which the medical
treatment cases suggest is necessary to override parental
choice.' 99 While some medical evidence suggests that smoking
may increase the likelihood of respiratory or cardiovascular diffi-
culties,2° this potential danger does not seriously jeopardize a
child's life. Because courts generally overrule parental decisions
only when convinced that a child faces death or serious health
problems, they should surely be reluctant to step in where the
parents' treatment of their children causes only speculative harm.
Since incidental exposure to parental smoke does not actually
193. Id. at 1063.
194. Id. at 1065-66.
195. State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757 (N.J. 1962) (dealing particularly with
parents' interests in freedom of religion and rights to care for and train their children).
196. 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1014.
199. For a discussion of the effect of cigarette smoke on children and its non-life-threat-
ening quality, see infra text accompanying notes 258-68.
200. See infra text accompanying note 257.
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threaten the child's life, the parents' fundamental right to make
choices affecting their children's physical care and environment
cannot be limited on the basis of their smoking.
4. State Justification
While smoking is not contemplated as an implied cotistitution-
al right, it is subsumed within a parent's fundamental right to
privacy. Therefore, state restriction of it must serve a compelling
end and must be implemented through means narrowly tailored to
serve that end.2' To justify restricting private cigarette consump-
tion, the state may assert its strong interest in the well-being of
minor citizens and its necessary protection of their health and
morality. By removing the influence of passive smoke, the state
may be able to eliminate the poor health associated with daily
inhalation of pollutants or with exposure to and acceptance of an
immoral habit.
While protection of a child is indeed a noble cause and a
legitimate state concern, closer scrutiny of a state's action to ban
smoking by parents at home reveals a plan which falls short of
this goal in terms of both ends and means. First, the harm targeted
is the possibility that the child will be physically or morally influ-
enced in an unfavorable way. While possibilities are not valueless,
they do not present a compelling end.2°" They certainly cannot
excuse interference with a parent's constitutional right to custody.
Whether parental smoke harms a child at all is far from set-
201. See supra text accompanying note 100. See also The Constitution and The Family,
supra note 98, at 1209 (advocating the use of heightened scrutiny with respect to the
rights to privacy and parenting by drawing an analogy to the heightened scrutiny afforded
similar First Amendment rights).
202. In decisions responding to infringements on First Amendment rights, the Court has
refused to recognize "theoretically imaginable" dangers as compelling state ends. See, e.g.,
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967)
(recognizing the potential conflicts of interest which exist when a salaried union employee
serves as the attorney for union members, but deeming this risk too speculative to justify
an infringement of the First Amendment right of association); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 33 (1968) (holding the potential for voter confusion to be insufficient to justify
a violation of the equal protection clause in the promulgation of election procedures). See
also Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 1978) (holding that state may
intervene in parental relationship with child only upon "a proper showing that parental
conduct threatens a child's well-being . . . ."). Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478
(1977) (noting that the state's interest in potential life grows as the pregnancy progresses);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (allowing the state's interest in potential life
to contravene the mother's right to choose whether to bear or beget a child only at the
point of viability).
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tied.20 3 The information available is contradictory and confusing,
establishing no more than a potential harm to the child. Thus, the
threshold requirement of a compelling state interest is not satisfied.
Furthermore, to charactere the possibility of harm from smok-
ing as compelling would seriously undermine parental control in
several areas. It is questionable whether the end would be desirable
in light of ihe consequences likely to follow from the validation of
such a restriction. If the state is allowed to enter the home to
regulate parental smoking, asserting potential harm to the child as
its shield against constitutional protections, it may easily gain au-
thority for a whole host of similar actions." 4 For example, a
smoking ban could serve as precedent for restrictions upon a
child's diet by comparing the detrimental similarities of foods high
in cholesterol or other "harmful nutrients" and ofpassive smoke.
Likewise, the perceived immorality of particular television venues
may be analogized to the harmful moral and physical effects of
parental smoking habits on their children. 05 While each of these
intrusions seem extreme, their assertion could be viably based upon
the same foundations as smoking restrictions.
Assuming arguendo the existence and recognition of a com-
203. See infra text accompanying notes 258-68.
204. In voicing his concerns over the increasing scope of regulations of smoking, one
commentator explains:
The private choice alternative, [leaving the choice to smoke up to the individu-
al] is consistent with the practices of a free society. The public choice alter-
native, [permitting strict government regulation] is the route to a tyranny of
personal preferences by one group over another. If the tyranny can be imple-
mented over smokers, ask yourself who and what comes next.
TOLLsON, supra note 9, at 118.
205. This parade of horribles argument is similar to warnings advanced by critics of
employers' recent intrusions into employees' private lives in efforts to terminate their
cigarette habits. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. As one source reports, the
limitation of smoking off-duty creates a precedent for the off-duty regulation of other
"bad" influences. Lori Elliott, Do You Smoke? Drink? If so, Some Employers Say, You
May as Well Stay Home, BUSINESS FIRST-COLUMBUS, May 18, 1987, vol. 3, § 2, at 3.
Bernard Dushman, president of the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and assistant
dean of Yale Law School, questions what management's next concern might be. Id. The
danger, according to Dushman, is that the company could say:
If you work here, you can't eat butter and if we find out there's butter in your
home, you're fired. If you take a pat of butter in a restaurant and someone
sees you and reports you, you're fired.
Id. Dushman argues that just as "cigarette" was easily replaced by "butter," so "butter"
can be replaced by "scuba diving," "divorce," "alcohol," and so forth, in effect opening
each aspect of one's private life to scrutiny to maximize the company's healthy work
force. Id.
SMOKING AND PARENTING
pelling state interest in protecting children from cigarette smoke,
the particular restriction at issue in this note, a ban on parental
smoking, is not sufficiently tailored to meet the goal of safeguard-
ing children's health and morality. On one hand, it is
underinclusive. Even if a parent does not smoke in the child's
presence, a relative or a friend could smoke in the child's home
and presence without recourse since the custody order would apply
to the parent alone. Children could be further exposed to smoke at
school, during work or in public buildings. There is simply no way
to effectively shield children from the tobacco smoke which the
public confronts on a daily basis in a myriad of unavoidable situa-
tions. Moreover, a child could personally take up the habit, pre-
senting the absurd but very real possibility that the child could
smoke at home while the parent could not.
Moreover, by restricting parental smoking, the judiciary effec-
tively takes a stand in an expansive social debate. It lashes out at
what it perceives to be a harm but fails to serve a compelling end
or promulgate closely-tailored means. No desirable end is furthered
by instigating an absolute ban on parental smoking. Since it deals
with only a single source, the overreaching restriction does not
effectively curtail children's exposure to cigarette smoke. Numerous
other points of exposure remain unaddressed. Placing a restriction
upon smoking within the home serves only to trample the funda-
mental right to parental privacy.2"
B. Custody Inquiry
The next issue to be considered is whether the special process
of selecting the child's custodian justifies such an intrusion into the
home.20 7 In custody disputes, courts act on behalf of the children,
not on behalf of the parent-smokers or the state. When custody is
at issue, the court's right to intrude upon the home broadens. Com-
plicating the matter is the competition between parents for custody
of their children.0 8 The central question in this context is wheth-
206. Given the speculative nature of the harm involved and the weak protection the
restriction offers a child, it is quite possible that the decision would fail to satisfy even a
rational basis review.
207. For the purpose of this note, the custody determination will be assumed to relate
to a choice between two natural parents. While there are other permutations of such do-
mestic decisions, their unique considerations will be set aside.
208. "Custody 'embraces the sum of . . . rights with respect to rearing a child . . . . It
includes the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities
and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion.'" IRA
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er smoking may be considered a factor in the choice between
otherwise equally competent caretakers. 2° In essence, can smok-
ing provide the dispositive distinction between two natural parents?
The state's interest in the well-being of the family, and to a
greater degree of the child, stems from the English common law
concept of parens patriae, which posits the state as the patron of
its legally disabled citizens. t0 In this role, the state becomes the
caretaker of its children - the protector of those who cannot pro-
tect themselves.2n Unlike their adult counterparts, children are
unable to assume responsibility for themselves or to articulate their
needs and secure their own welfare. Thus, the state intervenes
on their behalf,213 striving to balance the parents' rights and the
child's best interests.
Acting in the parens patriae role, the state has advanced vari-
ous theories of custody, each operating as a "rule of thumb" or
presumption to aid in the judges' decisions.21 4 Early courts ad-
hered to the view that children were chattels to be automatically
awarded to their fathers' custody and control.215 Modem judicial
thought completely rejects this notion.216 In the early twentieth
century, this gender-based standard gave way to another, the so-
called "tender years doctrine. '' 2 7 The tender years doctrine re-
M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 463 (1986) (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2d, Parent & Child
§25)).
209. For purposes of this note, the inquiry will focus on the standard necessary to make
an initial custody determination. To modify a custody order, the same standards must be
met, but the proponent of change bears a heavier burden. The proponent must clearly
demonstrate a change in circumstances from the time of the initial order land a present
detrimental impact on the child's best interests. See Marshall H. Silverberg & Lisa A.
Jonas, Palmore v. Sidoti: Equal Protection and Child Custody Determinations, 18 FAM.
L.Q. 335, 342-43 (1984). This stricter review is justified by the fact that children require
stability to develop in a secure and emotionally well-balanced fashion. See Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1982) (noting that
"[t]here is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty
over whether he is to remain in his current 'home . . . -).
210. Silverberg & Jonas, supra note 209, at 340. Parens patriae literally means "parent
of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
211. Silverberg & Jonas, supra note 209, at 341.
212. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3 (1979).
213. Id.
214. ELLMAN et al., supra note 208, at 468.
215. Sharon G. Bradley, Child Custody and the Alcoholic Parent, 46 MONT. L. REV.
433, 434 (1985).
216. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (noting that parental interest in
custody involves rights more precious than property rights).
217. Bradley, supra note 215, at 434.
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flected the presumption that young children require their mothers'
care and prompted maternal custody in all cases, absent a clear
showing of unfitness." 8 Eventually, however, as fathers' rights
and abilities as parents gained recognition, it became evident that a
more equitable consideration of the custodial parent necessitated a
gender-neutral standard.219
Early in this historical progression, judges began to consider
the matter from the child's perspective and "began speaking in
terms of the child's best interests. '220 At one time, courts em-
ployed presumptions to determine the child's "best interests." Cur-
rently, a majority of jurisdictions undertake a broader inquiry
which accounts for the totality of circumstances surrounding a
child's custody and well-being.22'
To avoid arbitrary decisions with respect to the child's essen-
tial needs,22 the "best interests" theory uses the child's physical
and psychological well-being as its cornerstone.223 Courts attempt
to strike a balance between the child's "threshold liberty interest"
and the parent's fundamental custodial rights.224 Since the child is
218. Id.
219. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that "all Illinois parents
are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed
from their custody-). Modern courts profess to have abandoned the "tender years doctrine"
and to have shed their gender-based presumptions. However, some jurisdictions still adhere
to maternal custody or favor it heavily in an effort to avoid an analysis of the child's in-
terests. Bradley, supra note 215, at 434.
220. ELLMAN et al., supra note 208, at 468.
221. Id. at 469; MELVIN G. GOLDZBAND, CUSTODY CASES AND EXPERT WITNESSES: A
MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS 53 (1980).
222. Steve Susceff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay
or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 852, 856 (1985).
223. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 267 (1987). Notwithstanding the progress which
has been made since the equation of children with chattels, some critics maintain that the
"best interests" standard gives judges too much discretion and that custody decisions re-
flect judges' subjective views of what is important or "best." See JAMES C. BLACK &
DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY 42, 79-80 (1989) (arguing that the standard is tanta-
mount to coaxing the judge to "do your best!" and advocating a holistic approach to the
parent, the child and the relationship between the two); GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 212,
at 4 (providing a thorough criticism of the best interests standard and an insightful review
of the child's role in the process); Charlow, supra, at 267 (claiming the standard is sub-
ject to abuse by self-serving parents); Silverberg & Jonas, supra note 209, at 342 (charac-
terizing the standard as vague and susceptible to subjective interpretation); Stuart J.
Baskin, Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1383, 1391 (1974) (adjudging the "best interests" standard to be of little assis-
tance in defining the parties' true interests in an actual setting).
224. See Leonard P. Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 15 FAM. L.Q.
259, 329 (1982) (suggesting that a child has a "threshold liberty interest" and therefore
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the intended beneficiary of the adults' exertion of parental rights,
the "best interests" standard theoretically places the parties in the
same positions they would have been in had the custody dispute
never arisen or had they reached an agreement on their own.'
However, due to the child's vulnerability, care must be taken to
resolve any discrepancies in the child's favor.22
The "best interests" standard is the currently accepted rule in a
majority of jurisdictions 27 and, therefore, is the measure by
which the restriction on parental smoking must stand or fall. Since
smoking is a new area of concern in the context of child custody,
the regulation cannot be addressed by reference to past cases or to
pending disputes. Instead the issue must be resolved through a
comparative review of the treatment of analogous restrictions and
the broad discretionary scope of the courts' parens patriae power.
1. Alcohol/Drugs
Substance use and abuse has traditionally been accorded little
dispositive weight in child custody decisions. 8 Since the child's
the child's best interests must be considered along with other social concerns, such as the
parents' interests); see also In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 775 (Wash. 1942) ("Parents ...
primarily have the constitutional right to the custody and control of such minor children
and may give to those children such attention and training, as in the judgment of such
parents or guardians, may seem best for the welfare of the child or children and for the
good of society.").
225. Susoeff, supra note 222, at 861.
226. Id. at 853-54.
227. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 236-37 (1975). Most states* articula-
tion of the "best interests" standard mirrors that set forth in the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act which provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custo-
dy;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3)the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and communi-
ty; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
228. Bradley, supra note 215, at 433.
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welfare is the paramount consideration, the parent's condition pres-
ents but one factor to be weighed." Custody may be revoked
"only if that parent's use of the substance can be shown to affect
that parent's mental or physical health and that parent's relationship
with the child."'-' Hence, two essential elements must be proven:
(1) that the parent uses alcohol or drugs and (2) that this use is
detrimental to the child.23' The key is not the reputed effect of
the substance on the child, but the actual effect of the substance on
parental abilities or on parent-child interactions.232
2. Sexual -Promiscuity
The existence of parental sexual "misconduct" does not auto-
matically result in revocation of custody.233 Several courts have
taken the position that the private lives of adult parents should not
be restricted absent proof of an illicit effect upon the child23 or
229. Id.
230. In re Becton, 474 N.E.2d 1318, 1325-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (granting a father
liberal rights absent a conclusive demonstration that the father's alleged use of marijuana
was detrimental to the child).
231. Bradley, supra note 215, at 436. In Jackson v. Jackson, 773 S.W.2d 512, 513
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989), a Missouri appellate court explained that "[t]he issue is not con-
demnation or approval of a moral standard but whether the conduct detrimentally affects
the child's welfare." The Jackson court relied upon In re Marriage of Newberry, 745
S.W.2d 796, 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). Id.
232. Alcohol becomes a dispositive factor only when its use reaches a level and degree
at which the parent's skills are impaired and the child's care suffers. See, e.g., In re R.J.,
436 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Iowa 1989) (terminating a mother's rights where "[h]er debilitating
condition pose[d] an immediate as well as long range threat to the children's well-being");
Duplessis v. Duplessis, 516 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (deeming a
mother's drinking problem to produce an unfavorable environment).
233. See, e.g., Schoonover v. Schoonover, 228 N.W.2d 31, 32 (Iowa 1975) (sexual pro-
miscuity is one factor to consider in a custody determination); M.D.R. v. P.K.R., 716
S.W.2d 866, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (custody may not be based upon extramarital sexu-
al misconduct alone). But see Mansell v. Mansell, 583 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (relying on L.H.Y. v. J.M.Y., 535 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)) (finding
that an immoral lifestyle may influence an impressionable youth and holding that the
court did not have to wait for manifestations of harmful consequences before taking action
on the child's behalf).
234. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wellman, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148, 152 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that a decision should not be based upon disapproval of a parent's morals
or other personal characteristics which do not harm or have a significant bearing on the
child); Manley v. Manley, 389 So. 2d 454, 456-57 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
custody of the child should remain with the mother because the mother's boyfriend's fre-
quent overnight stays did not cause harm to the child); Michael T.L. v. Marilyn L.J., 525
A.2d 414, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (deciding that trial court's perception of mother's
conduct as immoral was a "gross abuse of discretion" in the face of the child's healthy
development); In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (noting
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a detrimental strain upon the parent-child relationship. 235  Thus,
even where some degree of sexual promiscuity has occurred, revo-
cation of custody cannot be justified without this clear demonstra-
tion.23
6
Similarly, this same level of proof is required to revoke custo-
dy based on a parent's possession of obscene materials. In one
case, a mother's custody was challenged in part on the ground that
she had littered her house with sexually-explicit photographs and
"dirty" magazines. 237 Relying upon the First Amendment's protec-
tion of the "obscene" literature and the privacy protections of the
home, the appellate court refused to revoke or regulate the
mother's parental rights.238  Reasoning that "sexual liberation"
does not make for an unfit parent, the court noted that, absent
specific evidence of harm to the child, there was no basis for
intervention.239
Finally, when courts terminate a parent's custody based on
sexual morality, it is of paramount importance that courts look to
the children's best interests, not the community's morality.2'
Holding a parent unfit should represent immediate concern about
the child in a particular home at a particular time rather than sub-
jective assessments of the parent's activity. According to one court,
"while the sexual life style [sic] of a parent may properly be con-
sidered in determining what is best for the children, its consider-
ation must be limited to its present or reasonably predictable effect
that, for an illicit relationship to cause a change in custody, there must be a showing of
harmful effect on the child).
Some courts have imposed time and place restrictions to shield the child from cer-
tain damaging consequences. See, e.g., In re Marriage of G.B.S. and A.L.S., 641 S.W.2d
776, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (conditioning custody on father's agreement not to live
with woman to whom he was not married).
235. See, e.g., Temos, 450 A.2d at 122 (refusing to consider a mother's personal life
where children were well-adjusted and shared a good relationship with their mother).
236. "So long as a court can relate a parent's relevant moral behavior to the best inter-
ests of the child, evaluation of such conduct seems unassailable." Strickman, supra note
224, at 331.
237. Feldman v. Feldman, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
238. Id. at 510-11.
239. Id. at 510. The Court of Appeals in Feldman criticized the trial court's willingness
to equate fathers' and mothers* participation in the culture of "free sex" with parental un-
fitness, warning that "[t]he logical extension of the rationale of the trial court's position is
to place the children of 'swinging* couples in foster homes or orphanages." Id.
240. This point is made especially clear by cases in which the aberrant behavior on
which the custody revocation is based is that of a homosexual parent. Susoeff, supra note
222, at 859 (arguing that gay and lesbian parents are viewed in terms of stereotypes
rather than individual characteristics).
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upon the children's welfare."24' Thus, before a parent is found
unfit, the court must find an actual detrimental effect on the chil-
dren.
3. Smoking
There are two acceptable justifications for restricting parental
smoking, protecting the child's health from the risks commonly
associated with passive smoke and/or insulating the child from
arguably immoral behavior.242  The critical question is whether
either justification provides an acceptable avenue to determine
custody and to regulate adult activity under the guise of conditional
custody. In light of these concerns, would an outright prohibition
on smoking best serve the child's interests?
The assertion that smoking represents an immoral influence on
children offers tenuous justification. The fact that so many Amer-
icans partake of this habit243 dampens the fervor of the moralistic
approach.2" Nonetheless, assuming the presence of an adverse
influence, is this fact alone enough to restrict parental smoking? A
comparison with other "immoral" habits suggests it is not.
Considered immoral influences by some, both sexual promis-
cuity and homosexual activity have been the subject of past regu-
lation.245 However, to justify restricting a parent's supposedly un-
wholesome activities or possessions, there must be conclusive proof
of an actual detriment to the particular child or to the parent-child
relationship.21 Without this clear proof, courts cannot
interfere.247 Thus, cigarettes must have a detrimental influence on
241. DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (barring the
presence of the mother's lesbian lover during visitation because the mother failed to keep
her relationship separate from her role as a mother and such failure had a detrimental
effect upon her children).
242. Although there are other conceivable reasons for barring smoking, this note focuses
on these two because of their current popularity as societal criticisms of tobacco use in
general.
243. ToLLSON, supra note 9, at 89 (estimating that, in 1988, almost one third of the
American public smoked).
244. Although a majority alone does not determine whether something is moral or im-
moral, in a situation such as this, where the immorality tag stems from a personal prefer-
ence rather than an objective criticism, the number of persons who disagree is significant.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 233-41.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
247. See, e.g., Feldman v. Feldman, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)
(stating that "amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and what we conveniently consider
aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody").
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the child or on the parent-child relationship for their use to sub-
stantiate a legitimate restriction on a parent's custodial rights.
Measured against these criteria, smoking does not constitute an
immoral influence worthy of restriction. Even if the child were to
imitate the smoking parent and adopt the habit, it is difficult to see
how this addiction shared by so many can be labeled an immoral
act.24 After all, cigarette smoking is no more immoral than ex-
plicit photographs and promiscuity, yet these latter activities have
previously been held not to justify intrusion.2 49
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the habit would affect
the parent-child relationship or impair parental skills. Smoking does
not prevent a parent from providing the necessities of life or from
loving and caring for a child. Unlike drugs or alcohol, inhalation
of tobacco smoke does not impair or alter parental abilities. In fact,
a nicotine addict may be a better parent as a result of cigarette
use. The fulfillment of a craving for the substance may reduce the
parent's anxieties, rendering him or her a more functional and
rational person.2"°
Where morality is the asserted interest, regulation of a parent's
smoking would not provide a better parent, only a more socially
acceptable home environment. Under the "best interests" standard,
this subjective judgment is insufficient to influence a custody deci-
sion. Unless a parent becomes so entranced by the habit as to
neglect the child25' or to impair the parent-child relationship, the
state cannot restrict or revoke custody based on the parent's use of
cigarettes.
With respect to the child's physical health, the second reason
offered for the smoking restriction, the child must face an actual
detriment or serious threat before parental freedom can be en-
croached.252 Courts cannot guess what may be in the child's best
248. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 237-41.
250. Members of the medical community have identified nicotine as an anti-depressant
and have noted its positive effects on melancholics. Ken Hoover, Psychiatric Units Ques-
tion Smoking Ban, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1992, at A13. In addition, tobacco products have
been known to be effective stress-relievers. Carol J. Williams, East Europeans' Anxiety is
Going Up in Smoke; Despite Health Risks, Cigarette Sales are Booming in the Region.
The Stress of Democratization May be to Blame, L.A. TIMES, OcL 9, 1990, at 4.
251. See Schnexnayder v. Schnexnayder, 371 So. 2d 769 (La. 1979) (where the court
revoked custodian status of a mother who neglected the needs of her young children to
carry on a notorious affair).
252. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
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interests or what may pose a future threat. To survive judicial
scrutiny, the restriction must have some bearing on the child it
seeks to protect.
Opponents of parental smoking may argue that the habit dam-
ages the child's health, an argument supported by a growing body
of research on secondhand smoke.253 These studies indicate that
secondhand smoke is even more harmful for children than adults.
There are two reasons for this difference. First, children respire
more frequently and, as a result, inhale more pollutants than do
adultss Second, as a consequence of their youth, children have
less opportunity to extract themselves from the pollution.25 Re-
search has suggested that children of smoking parents have "mea-
surable deficiencies in physical growth, intellectual and emotional
development, and behavior. 2 56 Further, smokers' children are
typically more susceptible to respiratory illness and other smoke-
related health problems.5 7
As persuasive as it sounds, however, this evidence regarding
the youthful passive smoker is far from conclusive. Many of the
studies have been heavily criticized as inaccurate and incomplete;
some have been accused of promoting unwarranted anxiety with
respect to tobacco pollution.5 8 Several experts have suggested
that damp living conditions,259 coal heating devices2W and gas
cooking stoves26' have as much, if not more, to do with the
child's poor health than does parental smoking.
Not only have the studies' methods and premises come under
attack, but the conclusions also. Only weak scientific- evidence
appears to support a causative effect between parental smoking and
viral infection,262  respiratory illness,263  lung function and
capacity2 4 and increased mortality rate,265 all prominently tout-
253. See 1986 REPORT, supra note 33; see also Cowley, supra note 33 (reporting a
new EPA study which reiterates the gravity of the risk secondary smoke poses to chil-
dren).
254. Cowan, supra note 5, at 397.
255. Id.
256. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR WOMEN 191 (1980).
257. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 438.
258. TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 119-20.
259. Id. at 123, 133.
260. Id. at 135.
261. Id. at 128.
262. Id. at 136.
263. Id. at 136, 143-44.
264. Id. at 135, 137, 140-41.
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ed effects. Opponents of the causal link suggest that dissipation of
harmful tobacco smoke requires no more ventilation than necessary
to counteract human by-products such as carbon dioxide and body
odor.2" Without proper ventilation, cigarette smoke would build
up, but' so would dust and other substances capable of producing
much more harm than a parent's cigarette.267
Thus, the grave effects presumed to flow from the cigarette's
tip may not be so conclusively harmful after all. Secondhand
smoke remains a debatable issue, leaving unsettled the question of
whether a child's health will be impaired by the parent's habit. The
symptoms exhibited by some children of smokers have not been
shown to be the result of smoke, instead of the product of inde-
268pendent causes or of genetic predisposition.
In light of such inconclusive findings, courts may not impose
a smoking ban in ordinary cases. If the child has a medical condi-
tion, for example, allergies, respiratory disease, or asthma, which
the smoke would aggravate, then an objective basis for the restric-
tion would exist and its imposition might be proper. Absent such
conditions, the parent's use of tobacco is simply irrelevant to cus-
tody. The "best interests" standard takes the child's physical health
seriously, but only in tandem with the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding his or her custody.2 69 The environment itself, no matter
how hypothetically bad, may not be altered without demonstration
of an existing, concrete harm to the child.270 If a parent's actions
produce no detriment in the child, deference must be paid to the
parent's rights to custody and control.
Therefore, neither moral nor physical justifications provide a
basis for the restriction or revocation of custody. Neither assertion
can meet the threshold burden which requires proof of damage to
the child or detriment to the parent-child relationship. Smoking is
relevant only to the extent it clearly affects the child's health or
nurturing. Since a smoker's home is no less fit than a
265. Id. at 138, 143.
266. Id. at 123-24.
267. Id. See also Cowley, supra note 33 (relating the Tobacco Institute's position that
the studies finding a link between parents' secondary smoke and children's respiratory
illnesses do not adequately control the causative factors involved).
268. Id. at 144.
269. Silverberg & Jonas, supra note 209, at 341 n.59. See also In re Hudson, 126 P.2d
765, 776 (Wash. 1942) (citing the child's health and well-being as important consider-
ations in the custody evaluation).
270. See In re Becton, 474 N.E.2d 1318, 1326 (III. App. Ct. 1985)
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nonsmoker's, the distinction is irrelevant. Smoking provides inade-
quate grounds for intrusion.
CONCLUSION
This most recent step in the antismoking crusade advances a
bit too far. While reasonable restrictions may be imposed upon
persons in community areas, such as in the employment or public
domains, there is no vehicle by which those restrictions may be
conveyed into the private home. The right to parent, intrinsic in the
concept of the right to privacy, prohibits the state's foray into the
home in the interest of the child. Parents are endowed with the
right to guide their child's moral and physical upbringing and to
impose conditions which they feel are warranted.
Furthermore, even in the context of a custody dispute between
two natural parents, each possessing the fundamental right to par-
ent, there is no basis for the restriction. The activity in no way
impairs the adult's functioning or fitness, nor does it deter the
formation of a nurturing and desirable bond with the child. With
the conflicting reports of the actual harm presented, there is no
assurance that the harm against which it purports to guard exists.
Moreover, while future hazards may loom, in light of the many
generations of children reared in smoking homes who have not suf-
fered complications or significant disadvantages, smoking simply
does not provide adequate grounds to distinguish a fit parent from
an unfit parent.
Finally, if smoking does present a risk to the child, the proper
route is not necessarily prohibition of the activity. There are nu-
merous alternatives which may better serve the interests of parent
and child alike. For example, educational efforts aimed at inform-
ing the parent of the risk at which the child may be placed may
serve to induce parents to voluntarily avoid cigarettes." Alterna-
tively, if the problem is truly significant, a legislative effort could
be waged which targets the sale and possession of tobacco rather
than the personal use.
Imposition of a ban simply cannot be justified either in consti-
tutional or custodial terms. Its breadth reaches beyond the powers
of the court and into the realm of the parent. De Beni Souza
271. In accord with this suggestion, one author advocates that, rather than prosecuting
parents for smoking in their homes, the state should attempt to educate parents and make
them aware of the risks passive smoke pose. Cowan, supra note 5, at 424-25.
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should not be subjected to conditional custody but should be al-
lowed to exercise her parental rights and personal freedoms to the
fullest extent possible. Like all persons who legally smoke ciga-
rettes and lovingly raise children, she should live free from judicial
scrutiny in her home and without intrusion on her personal habits.
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